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Abstract
We examine the effects of uncertainty on several facets of the financial sector. Us-
ing a large country-level unbalanced panel dataset, we show that inflation uncertainty
reduces availability of private sector credit; harms banks’ efficiency and operational
performance, evidenced by lower returns and increased reliance on non-interest income
activities; and distorts sectoral stability, as liquidity, banks’ appetite for risk and credit
risk increases. Our findings, based on the full dataset and country splits, are economi-
cally meaningful and provide evidence that uncertainty threatens the overall health of
the financial sector.
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1 Introduction
Financial intermediaries play a vital role in an economy by allocating scarce resources to-
wards potential borrowers with the most promising prospects. However, under uncertainty,
as relative prices can no longer be predicted with precision, an efficient allocation of funds
may fail to materialize. This failure is possibly due to managers’ unwillingness to bear risks
or, equally, due to a shift in their risk preferences, which ultimately impact the availability
of credit, efficiency and the stability of the financial sector. Despite researchers’ intensified
efforts to understand the effects of uncertainty on the functioning of financial intermediaries
in the aftermath of the 2007–08 global financial crisis, most studies have focused on a par-
ticular aspect of financial institutions such as credit, profitability, liquidity or loan quality.1
The literature has not provided a comprehensive view on the overall health of major financial
institutions under uncertainty, despite the calls from both academicians and policymakers
(see for example, Cˇiha´k et al., 2012; Law and Singh, 2014; Arcand et al., 2015).2
In contrast to the prior literature, we explore the impact of uncertainty on the overall
functioning of the financial sector by taking into account the multidimensional nature of the
question under investigation. A broad exploration of uncertainty effects is relevant given the
ongoing debate whether monetary policy makers could aim to identify and remove balance
sheet impairments which can easily block the flow of funds that the productive sectors seek
while they strive to maintain the stability of financial institutions (e.g., see Smets, 2014 and
Sannikov and Brunnermeier, 2013).
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we investigate the effect of
uncertainty on different aspects of financial institutions using a large panel of international
1For example, Louzis et al. (2012) examined the determinants of banks’ non-performing loans; Delis et al.
(2014) investigated US banks’ lending decisions during periods of anxiety; and Khan et al. (2017) studied
the role of funding liquidity on bank managers’ risk-taking behavior.
2See, among others, Boyd et al. (2001) who studied the effect of inflation on the development of banking
sector and equity market activities; Beck et al. (2013) who compared the relative performance of (Islamic
and conventional) banks on different aspects including their business model, efficiency, asset quality and
stability.
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data from 89 countries for the period between 1996 to 2015, encompassing the period of
the global financial crisis. In particular, we focus on financial depth, efficiency and stability
of the financial sector under uncertainty. To carry out the investigation, we exploit a new
database, the World Bank’s Global Financial Development, which provides country-specific
information on an annual basis. An examination that utilizes data from several countries is
important to capture sufficient variation across countries and time over the entirety of the
data. Consequently we can provide a broad view regarding the extent to which uncertainty
affects the financial sector. We find that uncertainty curtails the availability of credit to
the private sector; harms the efficiency of financial intermediaries, and adversely affects the
stability of the financial system. These findings suggest that uncertainty distorts several
facets of the financial system.
We also examine whether the uncertainty effects differ between high-income and low-
income economies. We show that uncertainty effects on financial depth and non-performing
loans are larger in low-income countries than high-income economies. In contrast, we find
that uncertainty has a significant impact on bank returns, liquidity and non-interest income
in high-income countries. An examination of the control variables in our models yields
evidence suggestive of crowding out effects for low-income countries: changes in GDP leading
to a decline in the availability of credit to the private sector. We also provide evidence that
the impact of foreign bank presence on the availability of credit varies between low- and
high-income economies, while such differences are not observed for other aspects.
An important question is whether the empirical results that we present have economic
significance. Using the parameter estimates for the full sample, we find that a one standard
deviation change in uncertainty could induce a 1.4% change in financial depth from its mean
value.3 Even though this seems small, as Bernanke (1983) and Bernanke and Gertler (1989)
discuss, even minor changes in the availability of credit can induce large fluctuations in an
3The average ratio of private credit to GDP in our sample is around 70%. Hence, the change in availability
of credit to private sector in response to a one standard change in uncertainty can easily amount to a figure
around 1% of GDP.
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economy. We find that bank returns decline in the order of 2% and non-interest income
increases by 1.4%, suggesting a decline in efficiency in the banking sector. What is more
worrying is that banks’ liquid assets increase by 4% and banks’ non-performing loans increase
almost 10% in response to a one standard deviation change in uncertainty. Considering that
uncertainty could increase considerably in a short period of time, the ultimate effect in all
aspects could be much higher than our back of the envelope calculations. Taken together, our
empirical results confirm the prediction that uncertainty adversely affects the functioning of
the financial sector through several channels.
To ensure robustness of our findings, we considered several variations of the key variables.
In contrast to most earlier research, we constructed uncertainty measures from dynamic
and static inflation forecasting models in addition to the intra-year standard deviation of
inflation. The latter measure, which is commonly used in the literature as “na¨ıve” inflation
uncertainty, can still be harmful given that risk insurance is costly and not perfectly available
in every country. The other two are more sophisticated measures that capture uncertainty
arising from the unexpected component of inflation. We used two variables to capture each
of the characteristics—depth, efficiency and stability—of the financial system. All models
contained several control variables to mitigate omitted-variables bias: the inflation rate,
real GDP growth, trade openness, ongoing banking crises, bank concentration, foreign bank
concentration, and international indebtedness relative to GDP.
While our main results are based on fixed effects methods, we demonstrated that the
use of the Instrumental Variables Generalized Method of Moments (IV-GMM) estimator
did not affect our conclusions. This ruled out potential problems of endogeneity among
the explanatory variables, as tests showed that these variables can be treated as exogenous,
providing further support for the empirical approach followed throughout the paper. As a
robustness check, we also excluded the top and the bottom 1 percentile of the observations
based on bank performance, inflation and inflation uncertainty, respectively, to rule out the
potential influence of outliers. Results from this exercise yielded similar results. Lastly, we
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should note that all variables in our panel regression models are verified to be stationary.4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of the lit-
erature. Section 3 describes the data and discusses the construction of uncertainty measures.
In Section 4, we initially provide visual evidence of uncertainty effects on the financial sector
and then presents the empirical model. Section 5 presents the empirical results, robustness
checks and discusses the economic significance of our findings. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Literature survey
Our investigation relates to many earlier studies which have separately focused on financial
depth and bank lending behavior, as well as the efficiency and stability of financial insti-
tutions. An examination of the literature yields a vast body of work which has examined
the relationship between financial development and stability.5 For instance, using aggregate
data, Bernanke and Gertler (1989) suggested that countries with developed and deeper fi-
nancial markets enable firms to have easier access to external funds. This in turn dampens
the impact of negative shocks on the economy. da Silva (2002) showed that countries with
deeper financial markets experience smoother business cycles, while Raddatz (2006) found
that financial depth helps to reduce output volatility in industries which strive for high levels
of liquidity. Another strand of papers have shown that bank lending varies over the business
cycle, declining during periods of extreme uncertainty or financial crisis (e.g., Ivashina and
Scharfstein, 2010; Puri et al., 2011; Delis et al., 2014; Kosak et al., 2015; and Caglayan and
Xu, 2016b). Taken together, researchers have argued that financial deepening is important
for the smooth functioning of the economy as well as mitigating the adverse effects of shocks.6
However, to our knowledge, earlier research has not specifically focused on the direct impact
of uncertainty on financial depth.
4Fisher-type panel unit root test results, which are available upon request from the authors, provided
clear evidence against nonstationarity.
5See Levine (2005) as well as Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Levine (2008) for detailed reviews.
6Also see Caglayan et al. (2017) on the role of financial depth in the transmission of monetary policy
shocks.
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Turning to studies that have focused on bank efficiency, we see that researchers have
associated significant reductions in bank profitability as a signal of an impending financial
crisis (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999, Bourke, 1989, Cornett et al., 2010b). Bikker and
Vervliet (2018) found that low interest rate environments reduce US banks’ profitability. In
a similar line, Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009) provided evidence that high risk periods
weaken banks’ returns. Bolt et al. (2012) further showed the effects of a 1% contraction in real
GDP during periods of deep recessions would lead to a 25 basis point decline in banks’ ROA
(return on assets). Separately, researchers who have examined banks’ non-interest income
have suggested that an increased level of income from this category leads to higher systemic
risk and lower efficiency (e.g., see Brunnermeier et al., 2012). In this context, DeYoung and
Roland (2001) and Lepetit et al. (2008) argued that changes in banks’ non-interest income
in periods of uncertainty can be taken to signal banks’ risk appetite and deterioration of the
efficient functioning of financial intermediaries.
Several other researchers have examined factors that promote stability of the financial
system and confirmed that liquidity plays an important role: an issue which was under the
spotlight during the 2008 financial crisis. In order to manage liquidity risk, bank managers
generate liquidity on their balance sheet by converting illiquid assets such as bank loans into
liquid assets like cash and securities (Berger and Bouwman, 2009). Hence, maintaining the
right amount of liquidity is essential to achieve stability. and to overcome cash shortages.
Gatev and Strahan (2006) and Gatev et al. (2009), among others, have shown that deposit
withdrawals and commitment drawdowns are negatively related to market stress. Acharya
and Naqvi (2012) developed a theoretical model to show the positive linkages between abun-
dant liquidity and bank managers’ risk-taking behaviors. In addition to liquidity, researchers
have used non-performing loans (NPLs) as a separate indicator to monitor stability of banks.
NPLs capture the asset quality of banks: higher NPLs indicate that banks are holding riskier
assets. To that end, most studies that examined the relation between the macroeconomic en-
vironment and credit risk have generally found economic conditions negatively affect NPLs
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(e.g., Louzis et al., 2012; Klein, 2013). It is interesting to note that higher management
quality can reduce problem loans, as shown in Berger and DeYoung (1997) and Louzis et al.
(2012).
In what follows, we provide empirical evidence that uncertainty adversely affects several
facets of the financial system. In doing so, we examine three aspects of the financial system
rather than just one to develop an understanding of uncertainty effects on the whole system,
and show that these effects are economically significant on each dimension.
3 Data
To pursue our study, we acquired data from various sources including the World Bank
Global Financial Development Database (GFDD), World Bank World Development Indi-
cators (WDI), DataStream, the US Energy Information Adminstration (EIA) and the Eco-
nomic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) website.7 We obtained both overall global and country-level
World Uncertainty Index (see Ahir et al., 2018) from the EPU website. The price of crude
oil was extracted from the US EIA website.8
From the GFDD, we extracted two different measures of financial depth which pro-
vided information on the amount of credit available to the private sector. Our first finan-
cial depth measure, FD1, is the ratio of domestic credit to private sector relative to GDP
(GFDD.DI.14). This variable gauges the financial resources provided to the private sector
through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, and trade credit and other accounts re-
ceivable that establish a claim for repayment. Our second financial depth measure, FD2,
which we used for robustness purposes, is the ratio of private credit to the real sector by
deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP (GFDD.DI.12).9
To examine the efficiency of banks, we extracted banks’ return of equity (GFDD.EI.06)
7EPU website: http://www.policyuncertainty.com
8EIA crude oil spot prices: https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet pri spt s1 d.htm
9The second measure does not include credit issued to governments, government agencies, and public
enterprises. Furthermore, credit issued by the central bank is excluded.
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and non-interest income to total income (GFDD.EI.03) from the GFDD. To examine the
stability of financial institutions, we obtained the ratio of liquid assets to total deposits
and short-term funding (GFDD.SI.06) and non-performing loans (GFDD.SI.02) from the
GFDD. Furthermore, we use gross domestic product (NY.GDP.MKTP.CD), the consumer
price index (GFDD.OE.02), bank concentration (GFDD.OI.01), and international debt
securities as a percentage of GDP (GFDD.OI.15) from the same database. We acquired
total exports and total imports from WDI. The monthly consumer price index (CPI) from
1996 to 2015 is downloaded from Datastream. The rest of the data span the period between
1996 and 2015, except for non-performing loans which become available in 1998.
3.1 Generating measures of inflation uncertainty
To construct measures of inflation uncertainty for each country, we used monthly CPI data
and followed three different approaches. The first inflation uncertainty measure is based on
the annual standard deviation of monthly logarithmic differences in CPI. This uncertainty
measure has been implemented by several researchers in the literature including Barro (1996),
Judson and Orphanides (1999) and Caglayan and Xu (2016a). In this respect, we use this
na¨ıve uncertainty measure to serve as a benchmark.
We then generate two additional model-based measures. The second measure is obtained
from a static model. We estimated an AR(p) model which took the following form:
pit = α +
p∑
i=1
βipit−i + t (1)
where pit is the log difference of CPI and t is a random term. Using the parameter esti-
mates, we then computed the sum of squared monthly differences between the actual and
the observed inflation for each year:
ĥy =
12∑
m=1
(piy,m − piy,m)2 (2)
where piy,m denotes inflation in year y and month m. The uncertainty measure, ĥy, obtained
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from this approach is our static inflation uncertainty measure. The process is repeated for
each country in the dataset where p is set to 4 for parsimony and uniformity.
The last uncertainty measure uses a similar AR(p) model. However, rather than esti-
mating the model for the full sample, we follow a rolling window approach by including an
additional observation in each estimation round after predicting the one-step-ahead inflation.
The difference between the predicted and the actual inflation rate is recorded as the observed
error. We then computed our dynamic inflation uncertainty measure by following equation
(2). In both measures, higher levels of the unpredicted component of inflation imply higher
uncertainty for the future level of inflation.
4 Preliminary evidence and the model
In this section, we provide visual evidence that uncertainty adversely affects the availability
of credit, efficiency and the stability of the financial system. Subsequently, we present our
models. All variables defined and discussed in the text are tabulated in Table 1.
Please place Table 1 about here
4.1 Visual inspection
Figure 1 provides the visual association between average dynamic inflation uncertainty and
the variables upon which we focus in this study including financial depth, efficiency and the
stability of financial intermediaries. These graphs are constructed by aggregating the data
on a country basis, where uncertainty is plotted on a logarithmic scale for convenience. The
top two graphs, (a-b), depict the association between uncertainty and two different measures
of average financial depth. The middle graphs, (c-d), plot uncertainty against average bank
profitability and non-interest income to total income, respectively. The last two graphs, (e-
f), plot the average bank liquidity and average bank non-performing loans against average
inflation uncertainty, respectively.
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Please place Figure 1 about here
Figures (a-b) present a clear and negative relationship between average dynamic inflation
uncertainty and both financial depth measures. These two graphs show that average credit
is lower in countries with high uncertainty. Figures (c-d) present mixed evidence in relation
to our expectations between uncertainty and efficiency: Figure (c), contrary to expectations,
shows that bank returns increase with uncertainty. However, this result is driven by data
aggregation, which occludes the negative bank returns. Figure (d), as expected, shows that
banks’ non-interest income is increasing with uncertainty. The last two graphs, Figures (e-
f), plot banks’ liquid asset holdings and banks’ non-performing loans, respectively, against
uncertainty. The associations depicted in these figures are in line with our expectations.
In Table 2, we provide the pairwise correlations between all variables we use in our
models. The table shows that the simple correlation between uncertainty and ROE is weak
and insignificant. For the other variables the association is significant at the 1% level.
Please place Table 2 about here
Given the prima facie evidence gathered from Figure 1 and Table 2, we proceed to
empirically examine the data implementing the models discussed below.
4.2 Empirical model
In what follows, we examine the impact of measures of uncertainty on three characteristics of
financial institutions: financial depth, efficiency and stability. To carry out our investigation
we employ the following model:
Indexj,t = α + β1hˆj,t−1 + λControlj,t + timet + νj + j,t (3)
where the dependent variable, Indexj,t denotes a variable that relates to the health of finan-
cial institutions in country j at time t. All variables are measured as of the end of the year
with the exception of the uncertainty measure, hˆj,t−1, our key explanatory variable, which is
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constructed using monthly data over the year.10 Based on the proxy used, our uncertainty
measures capture a different aspect of the observed volatility throughout the year.
We start our investigation by examining the impact of uncertainty on the availability of
credit to the private sector. We expect that an increase in uncertainty will lead to a decline
in availability of credit to the private sector as bank managers become more conservative in
their lending in a volatile environment. Hence, the uncertainty coefficient, β1, should take a
negative sign. We next examine the impact of uncertainty on the efficiency of the financial
sector. To do so, we estimate equation (1) by using two different efficiency measures as
dependent variables: return on equity (ROE) and the ratio of non-interest income to total
income (NII). ROE is a major indicator that researchers have used to investigate the
efficiency and operational performance of banks. Similarly, researchers have used NII to
capture the extent to which banks resort to riskier strategies.11 We expect to find a negative
impact of uncertainty on bank efficiency, for increases in uncertainty would trigger a fall in
bank profitability. In contrast, an increase in uncertainty would encourage bank managers to
increase their non-interest activities, as they search for high yield in a period when returns
from traditional operations fall and monitoring borrowers and recovery of funds become a
difficult task. Finally, to examine bank stability, we use bank liquidity and non-performing
loans as a dependent variable in equation (1). In line with the predictions of earlier literature
derived from bank-level data, we expect to find that both bank liquidity and non-performing
loans would increase with uncertainty.
To address potential specification error, our model contains several control variables
(Control). Exclusion of the control variables can potentially lead to biased results and
wrong conclusions in favor of the uncertainty effects on financial institutions. To that end,
research has shown that a model which examines the impact of uncertainty must contain the
corresponding level variable from which the uncertainty proxy was derived. Otherwise, one
10Details on uncertainty proxies are given in section 3.1.
11NII has been used as a forward-looking measure of risk by several researchers, including Buch et al.
(2014), Brunnermeier et al. (2012), DeYoung and Roland (2001).
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can incorrectly assign the role that the level variable is playing to the uncertainty variable.12
Thus, our model contains the rate of inflation (Inflation) as well as several additional
control variables including the GDP growth rate (∆GDP ) and a measure of trade openness
(Openness) to control for changes in domestic and foreign demand, respectively.
We also use a dummy variable (oBC) to capture the effects of ongoing banking crises.
This variable is constructed based on the following rules which are similar to that in Laeven
and Valencia (2013). We defined a banking crisis as systemic if there are 1) significant signs
of financial distress, captured by significant bank runs, losses in the banking system, and/or
bank liquidations; and 2) significant banking policy intervention measures due to significant
losses incurred in the banking system. The beginning of a systemic crisis is set to the year
when both criteria are met, while the end is defined as the year before both real GDP growth
and real credit growth are positive for at least two consecutive years.13 For EU countries,
we used banking crisis periods identified by the ECB (Lo Duca et al., 2017). For non-EU
countries, we have identified crisis episodes when the banking system of a country exhibits
significant losses pushing the share of non-performing loans above 20%.
In addition to the aforementioned variables, three more control variables are used in the
model. These variables measure bank concentration (Bank Concentration), foreign bank
concentration (Foreign Banks), and international indebtedness as a percentage of GDP
(Debt/GDP ). The former two variables control for the country-specific banking environ-
ment, and the last variable captures the role of foreign debt. We also include time fixed
effects in all models to allow for macro events that our control variables fail to capture. The
last two terms of the model depict country-specific fixed effects, νj, and the idiosyncratic
error associated with country j at time t, j,t.
12See Huizinga (1993) along these lines.
13Our definition, as the Laeven and Valencia (2013) data only cover the 1970–2011 period.
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5 Empirical findings
In this section, we present our empirical findings. Our main results are obtained using the
fixed effect methodology with cluster-robust standard errors to account for heteroscedasticity
and within-panel serial correlation in the idiosyncratic error term. The clusters are defined
by the country. We also present results based on the IV-GMM approach to show that
our results are robust to the choice of estimation method. All our models also contain
year dummies. Therefore, country-specific fixed effects capture country-level events that the
control variables do not, while the year dummies control for the changes in unobservable
shocks that may affect the functioning of global financial institutions.14
5.1 Uncertainty effects on aggregate credit
Table 3 presents the results for uncertainty effects on financial depth. The first three columns
present results for our first financial depth (FD1) measure, which is constructed as a ratio
of domestic credit provided to the private sector by financial corporations through loans,
purchases of non-equity securities, trade credit and other accounts receivable that establish
a claim for repayment. This is a standard proxy used in the finance and growth literature.
The last three columns lay out the results for the alternative definition of financial depth
(FD2) which captures the ratio of private credit to the real sector from deposit money banks
and other financial institutions to GDP, excluding credit issued to governments, government
agencies, and public enterprises.15 For each group, we initially present results for the un-
certainty measure which is obtained from a dynamic inflation forecasting model followed by
the uncertainty measure from a static inflation forecasting model and the annual standard
deviation of inflation. Regression results for all three uncertainty measures provide a similar
view: inflation uncertainty has a negative and significant effect on financial depth.
14We carried out the Hayashi C test (see Hayashi, 2000, pp 233–34 and Baum et al., 2007) to examine
whether the independent variables in these estimated models can be treated as exogenous. Based on this
test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity, and thus employed the fixed effects model for our
study.
15This proxy is a somewhat narrower indicator. See footnote 9.
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Please place Table 3 about here
The level of inflation, change in real GDP, openness, bank concentration and the pres-
ence of foreign banks have no significant effect on financial depth. However, we find that the
coefficient associated with an ongoing banking crisis (oBC) is positive and highly significant.
This result suggests that financial depth increases during periods of banking crisis, reflecting
the expansionary policies carried out by governments and central banks to promote recovery.
It should be stressed that this finding does not imply a deepening of financial depth in the
year of a banking/financial crisis, but rather throughout the period of financial crisis. For
instance, during the initial stages of the 2007–08 financial crisis, there was an acute credit
crunch in the markets. However, as the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the Eu-
ropean Central Bank carried out expansionary polices, the initial adverse effects of the crisis
on credit markets were mitigated and credit was made available to potential investors. In
addition, our empirical results show that a country’s ratio of international debt issues to
GDP (Debt/GDP ) has a positive impact on financial depth. This is sensible as Debt/GDP
measures the stock of outstanding international bonds relative to a country’s economic ac-
tivity and increases with countries’ income level (Beck et al., 2010). This finding suggests
that funds raised from external creditors are injected into the economy through the financial
system.
Overall, the results in Table 3 confirm that uncertainty has a negative effect on financial
depth. These results are robust to the use of three different uncertainty proxies and two
different measures of financial depth. Yet, it would be useful to evaluate the findings reported
in Table 3 by considering other studies which have used bank-level data to examine bank loans
over the business cycle. Researchers have shown that following monetary and financial shocks
bank loans decline sharply, making it difficult for bank-dependent borrowers to raise funds
from financial institutions (e.g., Ferri et al., 2014). Research has revealed that the cyclicality
of loans leads to inefficiencies in credit allocation, as during the expansionary state of the
economy banks can easily grant credit to firms with marginally positive or even negative
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net present value projects as bank lending standards decline and competition increases while
risks are underestimated. Contrarily, during recessionary periods, banks can even reject
loan applications of firms with positive net present value projects due to increased risk
premiums. No doubt, this behavior reflects banks’ increased risk aversion during recessionary
periods (see Ruckes, 2004 and Bassett et al., 2014). Furthermore, researchers also argued
that the extent of asymmetric information over the business cycle can affect banks’ risk
preferences. Hence, during the expansionary phase of the business cycle, banks tend to grant
more loans than in recessionary periods, as lenders suffer less from asymmetric information
problems during the upward phase of the economy. Moreover, the business cycle can affect
the cost of monitoring borrowers which in turn can lead to fluctuations in bank credit (e.g.,
Athanasoglou et al., 2014). If these bank-level observations are valid, then there will be
similar implications for overall private sector credit. Given that financial crises trigger deep
recessions, our findings complement the findings reported in the literature.
5.2 Uncertainty effects on bank efficiency
In this section, we discuss uncertainty effects on financial institutions’ efficiency as we ex-
amine banks’ return on equity and banks’ non-interest income to total income ratio.
Inspecting the first three columns of Table 4, we see that uncertainty has a negative and
significant impact on banks’ return on equity, ROE, in all models.16 As in the previous
table, uncertainty measures are based on dynamic and static inflation forecasting models as
well as the annual standard deviation of inflation. In models that focus on ROE, we see
that the level of inflation, GDP growth, openness, bank concentration and the debt to GDP
ratio have no significant impact on bank returns. The results show that bank returns during
16We are thankful to an anonymous reviewer who pointed out that in many developing countries, a
significant portion of bank profits is derived from lending to the central government. As a result, higher
uncertainty in these countries may actually lead to higher profits as the risk premium on government bonds
increases. Likewise, because real interest rates on consumer and business loans are usually higher than the
average rates in developed countries, profitability can increase if the risk premiums on such loans increase
along with uncertainty. Indeed, when we examine results for income group splits, we find that the coefficient
estimates for ROE as well as NII are both significant for the high-income country group and not for the
low-income country group.
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ongoing banking crisis episodes are negatively and significantly affected at the 1% level.
These observations complement findings reported in the literature. For example, Albertazzi
and Gambacorta (2009) have argued that bad economic conditions worsen the quality of
banks’ loan portfolio, and, therefore, generate credit losses and reduction in bank profits.
In a similar line, Cornett et al. (2010a) have reported that banks of all size groups suffered
as bank performance decreased before and during the recent financial crisis. Examining the
control variables, we find that only foreign bank concentration has a negative and significant
impact on banks’ return on equity. This is consistent with the literature which has shown
that the entry of foreign banks render national banking markets more competitive, reduce
profitability and costs of financial intermediation in the industry (e.g., Claessens et al., 2001;
and Claessens and Horen, 2014).
Please place Table 4 about here
Next, we examine the impact of uncertainty on banks’ non-interest income activities.
This set of activities, including income from trading and securitization, investment banking
and advisory fees and service charges, are considered to be separate from the traditional
deposit taking and lending functions of banks (see Brunnermeier et al., 2012) and deemed
to act as a forward-looking measure of bank risk. As a consequence, changes in non-interest
income activities may adversely affect banks’ earnings volatility because of a higher degree of
financial leverage. We report the impact of uncertainty on banks’ non-interest income ratio
in the last three columns of Table 4. We find that the uncertainty effect on non-interest
income is positive and significant at the 1% level in all models. These results suggest that
when income from traditional lines of business declines (which in consequence leads to a
decline in earnings to equity, as shown in the first columns), banks engage in other activities
to boost their profitability. This finding is consistent with the risk-taking channel through
search for yield (Rajan, 2006).
In fact, a number of researchers have found a significant positive relationship between
non-interest income activities and earnings volatility (see DeYoung and Roland, 2001, Stiroh,
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2004, Lepetit et al., 2008 and Abuzayed et al., 2018). For instance, Lepetit et al. (2008)
argued that non-interest income activities17 are considered to be riskier than traditional
credit creation, as it might be easier for customers to switch banks for these types of services
rather than traditional banking activities such as relationship lending. DeYoung and Torna
(2013) found that banks with increased exposure to activities such as investment banking,
insurance underwriting and venture capital also tended to take more risk in their traditional
banking activities. They argued that such banks were more aggressive in their lending
behavior, had less diversified and riskier loan portfolios, and funded their loan books with
less stable deposit bases. Hence, an increase in the non-interest income ratio can severely
affect the efficiency of banks’ operations.
Turning to other variables in the model we find that openness, bank concentration, the
debt to GDP ratio and the presence of foreign banks have no significant role in explaining
the behavior of non-interest income. In contrast, we find that inflation and changes in GDP
both exhibit a positive and significant impact. An increase in inflation may be taken as an
indicator of increasing economic activity. When economic activity increases, banks become
involved in non-interest income activities to extract more rent. Similar to the previous
models, an ongoing banking crisis exhibits a positive and statistically significant coefficient,
indicating that banks’ non-interest income activities increase throughout such episodes. In
periods of continuing crisis, as banks experience lower lending, their non-interest earning
activities increase while managers search for higher returns. Although boosting returns
through such activities may sound reasonable, increasing income through these more volatile
activities during times of higher uncertainty may adversely affect the efficiency of the financial
system.
Taking these findings together, we conclude that uncertainty affects the efficiency of
financial intermediaries negatively by reducing banks’ operational performance and increas-
ing risk-taking activities. Our findings are consistent with Kok et al. (2015), who have also
17Activities such as cash withdrawal fees, bank account management, or data processing.
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shown that greater reliance on non-interest income is related to weaker bank profitability.
The significance of ongoing banking crises in the model constitutes further evidence that
efficiency worsens during periods of banking crises when asymmetric information problems
heighten.
5.3 Uncertainty effects on bank stability
Table 5 presents uncertainty effects on banks’ liquidity and non-performing loans. We mea-
sure liquidity by the ratio of liquid assets to short-term funding plus total deposits. Non-
performing loans are defined as a ratio of defaulting loans to total gross loans.
The first three columns show that inflation uncertainty has a positive and significant effect
on liquidity at the 1% level. Our finding complements the literature which demonstrated that
during periods of disturbance, banks increase their liquid asset holdings (e.g., Cornett et al.,
2011). Several authors such as Gatev and Strahan (2006) and Gatev et al. (2009), have found
that deposit withdrawals and commitment drawdowns are negatively associated to market
stress. To be more specific, when a crisis occurs outside the banking system (e.g., in the
commercial paper market), the funds that investors remove from these instruments would
flow primarily into the banking system, because banks would be seen as a safe haven given
government guarantees on deposits.18 In models associated with liquidity, except for foreign
banks, other variables do not play a significant role. However, over the years, deregulation of
branching, activity restrictions and foreign banks’ presence in countries have increased the
intensity of competition among banks. Such changes in the financial markets have reduced
the cost of financial intermediation and profitability. In that sense, the presence of foreign
banks promoted the efficient use of liquid assets, which is captured by a negative and highly
significant coefficient in the first three columns of Table 5.
18We also checked whether liquidity will increase further during periods of extreme inflation uncertainty.
To capture asymmetric uncertainty effects, we generate a dummy variable which we set to 1 if hˆExtj,t ≥ 70
and 0 otherwise. We find that liquidity further increases during these severe uncertain phases. Results are
available upon request.
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Please place Table 5 about here
Nevertheless, availability of excess liquidity can induce bank managers to seek higher
returns and encourage excessive credit volumes as bank managers may misprice the down-
side risks (e.g., Acharya and Naqvi, 2012). This is further acerbated as loan officers are
compensated based on the volume of loans they book, while they are only penalised if the
bank suffers from a liquidity shortfall. Moreover, during periods of high macroeconomic risk,
investors would prefer to save with banks rather than making direct investments elsewhere.
As a consequence, high levels of liquid assets may induce bank managers to engage in risker
activities, at the detriment of stability of the financial system.19 To that end, in Table 4,
we have already shown that banks increase their non-interest income activities in periods of
uncertainty.
The next three columns present the impact of uncertainty on non-performing loans. In
particular, we find strong positive results based on both static and dynamic uncertainty
measures, yet there is no significant impact when we use the standard deviation of inflation
as a measure of uncertainty. Furthermore, as expected, we find that an ongoing banking
crisis displays a positive and significant coefficient. These findings are consistent with the
literature on loan quality and the macroeconomic environment (e.g., Loutskina, 2011; and
Klein, 2013). In particular, during periods of tranquility, banks have fewer problem loans
as both businesses and households have sufficient streams of revenues and income to repay
their debts. However, rapid growth in an economy is often associated with a deterioration in
lending standards. Consequently, debt servicing and repayment of loans would be severely
affected by economic downturns and changes in credit markets. As a result, when a recession
sets in, the risk of insolvency significantly increases, as weaker and less efficient businesses
and consumers with burdensome mortgages fail to pay back their loans (e.g., Louzis et al.,
2012; Klein and Olivei, 2008; Klein, 2013; and Claessens et al., 2014).
19Lepetit et al. (2008) argued that non-interest income activities such as cash withdrawal fees, bank
account management, or data processing are considered to be riskier than traditional credit extension, as
customers can easily switch banks for these types of services rather than standard banking activities.
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In models that explain non-performing loans under uncertainty, we find no impact due
to inflation, changes in GDP and bank concentration. In contrast, we find that openness
has a positive effect. This may be due to the fact that openness, as it increases competition,
reduces firms’ profitability. Hence, in competitive markets, weak firms fail, leading to an
increase in non-performing loans of banks. We also find that the ratio of foreign debt to
GDP has a positive effect on non-performing loans. The presence of foreign banks has a
negative impact on non-performing loans, possibly due to their ability to sift firms with low
quality investment projects from their loan portfolio (Claessens and Horen, 2014).
In summary, our results reveal that uncertainty affects the stability of global financial
institutions negatively, with higher liquidity asset holdings and lower asset quality.
5.4 Further evidences on country-income splits
We have examined three different aspects of financial markets, financial depth, efficiency and
stability, to provide a broader view on the impact of uncertainty on the health of the financial
sector. We augment each model with several country-specific variables as well as country
and year fixed effects which control for annual or country-specific shocks that our control
variables fail to capture. Our findings, which are robust to the use of different measures of
uncertainty, show that inflation uncertainty has a negative impact on the financial sector.
In what follows, we present further evidence in support of our findings, based on high versus
low-income country splits. In doing so, we can test whether uncertainty effects differ across
income groups. For brevity, we present the results only for the dynamic uncertainty measure.
The results from other measures provide a similar view and are available from the authors.
Table 6 presents the results for high-income (H inc) versus low-income (L inc) country
categories.20 All models in the table contain the same set of control variables as employed
in the earlier tables.
20The World Bank has divided the world’s economies into four different income categories by the level of
income: high, upper-middle, lower-middle and low. Our high-income group is comprised of countries whose
income levels fall within the high and upper-middle income category, and low-income group is composed of
countries whose income is at the lower-middle and low income category.
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The results are displayed in the order: financial depth (wider and narrower definitions),
return on equity and non-interest income, liquidity and non-performing loans. The first two
columns of the table show that uncertainty has a negative effect on both high- and low-
income countries for both financial depth measures. In particular, we find that uncertainty
has a larger coefficient for low-income countries: an increase in uncertainty leads to a sharper
decline in financial depth in low-income countries, all things equal. This result is expected,
as inflation is a bigger concern for low-income countries.
Please place Table 6 about here
When we turn to variables that measure efficiency in financial institutions, we find that
uncertainty has the expected effects as shown in Table 4. Uncertainty effects are signifi-
cant for bank returns and non-interest income only in high-income countries. Insignificant
effects of uncertainty on profitability in low-income countries could be due to the presence
of government-owned institutions without a profit-maximizing mandate.21 Similarly, in a fi-
nancially underdeveloped environment, banks would not necessarily be experiencing changes
in their non-interest income. Therefore, a lack of significance in low-income countries should
not be too surprising for these variables.
Regarding the stability dimension of financial intermediaries, we find again that the effect
of uncertainty on liquidity and non-performing loans are in line with Table 5. In the case of
liquidity, the effect of uncertainty is significant only for high-income countries. Yet, inflation
uncertainty is significant at the 1% level for both high- and low-income economies. In fact
the uncertainty effect on non-performing loans is significantly higher in low-income countries
than that in high-income countries. During periods of banking crises, both high and low-
income countries experienced significant lower profitability. In addition, we find that foreign
banks were less profitable only in developed countries (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999).
21As a significant portion of bank profits is derived from lending to the central government, increasing
uncertainty may actually yield profits as the risk premium on government bonds increases.
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When we inspect the role of control variables, we find similar results compared to our
earlier observations in most cases. One of the most interesting differences relates to the
role of changes in GDP. We find that the effect is highly significant and negative for low-
income countries for most of the models, whereas it is generally insignificant for the high-
income countries. This finding suggests that if government expenditures are the main driver
of growth in low-income countries, then expansionary fiscal policies simply crowd out the
private sector from the capital markets. The banking crisis variable assumes similar effects
in relation to our earlier findings, and we observe no significant differences between high- and
low-income country groups except for the case of efficiency, ROE and NII results given in
columns 3 and 4. Results in column 3 show that the coefficient of the bank crisis dummy is
much larger for low-income countries, while results in column 4 show that the same coefficient
is larger for high-income countries. This suggests that the financial sector in high-income
countries bounces back from financial crises more quickly than that in low-income countries.
This is perhaps due to the fact that banks in low-income countries have to play further roles
in supporting the economy, such as holding a large stock of sovereign debt.22
Furthermore, we find that pooling country income information as we did in Tables 3–5
masks the effect of foreign bank presence on credit between country groups. As columns
1 and 2 show, for high-income countries there is a strong positive relationship between
foreign ownership and credit, while for low-income countries, we find a significant negative
relationship. This may be because foreign banks increase access to financial services and
enhance financial and economic performance of their borrowers (Claessens et al., 2001).
However, research has also shown that foreign banks can target certain type of borrowers
undermining the consumers general access to financial services. Such actions in return worsen
the credit pool and lower financial development in emerging countries where relationship
lending is important (Claessens and Horen, 2014).
22This makes sense if the financial sector in low-income countries is dominated by large state-owned banks.
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5.5 Further robustness checks
To further ascertain the robustness of our findings, we carried out several sensitivity anal-
yses.23 We first examined whether using an instrumental variables technique would make
a difference. Fixed effects models are estimated assuming that explanatory variables are
exogenous or predetermined. If endogeneity appears among the regressors, these models will
yield biased estimates. To guard against this possibility, we estimated the model using the
IV-GMM methodology using 2 to 3 lagged values of inflation uncertainty, inflation, real GDP
growth and openness as instruments. The results are given in Table 7 using the dynamic
uncertainty measure.24 Notice that the sign, size and the significance of the uncertainty
coefficients in all columns are similar to our earlier findings. Also notice that the Hansen
C test, equivalent to a Durbin–Wu–Hausman test of OLS versus IV, cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the specified regressors can be treated as exogenous. These observations
provide evidence that the empirical approach and the associated results are valid.
Please place Table 7 about here
Secondly, we examined whether inflation uncertainty is picking up any effect emanating
from other sources of uncertainty.Hence, we augmented our models with two different types of
uncertainty measures: the country level World Uncertainty Index (WUI), proposed by Ahir
et al. (2018), and oil price uncertainty. The rationale for including the country level WUI
is that it covers 143 countries and constructed using country reports from the same source
tailored to national economic and political developments. Oil price uncertainty is included
into our models to gauge the stability of the macroeconomy as it may capture volatility
effects emanating from commodity markets. Results given in Table 8 show that the sign and
significance of the dynamic inflation uncertainly is similar to our earlier results and that the
added uncertainty measures do not affect our claims. In addition, we also re-estimated our
23We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting these additional sensitivity checks.
24Results for the static and standard inflation volatility measures were similar and available upon request.
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models by replacing the country-level WUI with the aggregate WUI and the EPU proposed
by Baker et al. (2016). Results from these exercises did not qualitatively change our main
findings. Hence, we refrained from presenting these results, which are available from the
authors, to save space.25
Please place Table 8 about here
We also examined whether our results could be driven by outliers. We reestimated all
models after excluding the top and bottom 1 percentile of the observations based on bank
performance, inflation and inflation uncertainty to overcome the influence of the outliers.
This exercise yielded similar results and are available upon request. Finally, we carried out
additional checks to see if the results are sensitive to high/low income groupings. We found
weak results for the high income country group, while results for the low-income (i.e. the
remaining) countries were similar to our earlier findings. For the high-income countries, key
variables had less variability both between countries and over time, weakening findings for
this group.26
5.6 Economic significance of our findings
Examining data that relate to the three characteristics of the financial institutions including
financial depth, efficiency and stability, we have demonstrated that uncertainty adversely
affects the health of financial systems. However, the coefficient estimates do not necessarily
highlight the magnitude of this adverse effect. To overcome this hurdle, we used the point
estimate of the dynamic uncertainty impact coefficient (βˆh) for each of the variables in Tables
3–5 and computed the corresponding elasticity. Then, we calculate the implied percentage
25Ahir et al. (2018) argue that the WUI is more consistent and replicable across countries in comparison
to the EPU index because the construction of the EPU relies on data from a large set of newspapers from
different countries.
26We examined several variants of high income versus the rest of country data splits including the OECD
versus the rest of the world, the OECD + 6 Major Emerging Countries vs the rest of the world. These
results are available upon request.
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change of the financial indicator in response to a one standard deviation (sigma) change in
dynamic uncertainty.27 Table 9 presents these findings.
Please place Table 9 about here
Starting with financial depth, regardless of the measure used, we find that a one sigma
increase in uncertainty leads to a 1.4% contraction in credit available to the private sector
from its mean.28 Given that the average ratio of private credit to GDP in our sample is
around 70%, the expected change in the size of private credit can be calculated to be in the
order of 1% of GDP, which is substantial. Significant reductions in availability of credit will
push the economy into a recession, as businesses and consumers would not be able to raise
funds to invest or spend when funds are needed the most. In return, banks will suffer as
weaker or less efficient borrowers will fail to pay their earlier debts due to the recession. As
a consequence, bank profitability from traditional activities will decline, forcing managers to
seek higher returns elsewhere. To that end, we find that a one sigma increase in uncertainty
from its mean would lead to almost a 2% contraction of banks’ return on equity. Examining
the changes in non-interest income of banks in response to a similar change in uncertainty, we
see that bank NII activities would increase by 1.38% to a similar size increase in uncertainty.
When we turn to the effect of uncertainty on the stability of the financial sector, we find
that banks will increase their liquid assets by 3.83% in response to a one sigma increase in
uncertainty to weather the difficult times. The largest impact is observed for non-performing
loans, which increase by almost 10%. In that sense, we see that the adverse effects of an
increase in uncertainty will be observed in all financial sectors.
Given these results, it is clear that an increase in uncertainty significantly undermines
27The elasticity is computed at the mean value of the financial indicator and the uncertainty measure
using ∂Index/∂h× h¯/Index, where h¯ and Index denotes the average values of inflation uncertainty and the
variable corresponding financial indicators, respectively.
28Note that here we report the implied percentage change at the mean value of each financial indicator in
response to a one standard deviation shock in uncertainty, i.e. Elasticity × hsigma/h¯ = ∆(Index)/Index.
To compute the percentage point changes in an indicator, one should calculate the product of the value given
under Impact and the mean of the indicator.
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the health of the financial system. Although the responses of some variables may appear
to be small, it is useful to recall that seemingly small shocks can lead to large fluctuations
in aggregate economic activity (see Bernanke, 1983 and Bernanke and Gertler, 1989). For
instance, the calculated change in financial depth, although small, may be sufficiently large
enough to push the economy into a recessionary phase. Furthermore, the fact that we
observe the highest response to a one sigma change in uncertainty on variables which we use
to measure stability of the system (bank liquidity and non-performing loans) is worrisome as
this confirms the findings of Bloom (2009), who argues that sharp drops in economic activity
happen in response to shocks to volatility.
At this point, one can also consider the extent to which uncertainty would affect the
financial system of a specific country of interest. Although within the context of our analysis
it is not possible to provide an exact answer, we can make an educated guess using the pa-
rameter estimates estimated for high and low-income countries. Therefore, for each variable,
we compute separate elasticities for high and low-income countries and then examine the
maximum uncertainty effect for a number of countries.29
Consider two low-income countries such as the Philippines and Pakistan. Using the
point estimates that relate to low-income countries, we compute that financial depth (FD1)
in these countries would decline approximately by 17% and 35% as uncertainty reaches
its maximum observed level. These are substantial changes. In the case of high-income
countries we take Spain and the USA as an example. For Spain, we compute that financial
depth would decline by 3.1% and in the USA by 2%. When we compute expected changes in
bank returns, we find that bank returns would decline by 5% in Spain and 3.4% in the USA.
To ascertain these estimates it would be useful to carry out country-specific analyses as our
predictions are based on elasticities obtained for a large cross-country panel dataset. Yet
what we present here shows that sudden bursts in uncertainty may have substantial adverse
29Rather than examining the effect of a one standard deviation change in uncertainty, we calculate max-
imum effects. We follow this approach because uncertainty happens in bursts, for short periods of time,
affecting the whole of the economy as discussed in Bloom (2009).
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effects on the financial system.
6 Conclusion
There is an ongoing debate as to whether monetary policy authorities should strive to iden-
tify and remove balance sheet impairments which can easily block the flow of funds that
productive sectors of the economy seek while promoting the proper functioning of the finan-
cial sector. To that end, several studies have examined bank behavior over the business cycle
or during periods of banking crises, while several others have looked at the efficient allocation
of bank loans during periods of instability. Our study complements this line of literature, as
we examine the extent to which uncertainty affects the functioning and soundness of finan-
cial intermediaries. In contrast to the literature, we do so by presenting evidence from three
aspects of financial intermediation: availability of credit in an economy, profitability and
bank liquidity. To carry out our analysis, we use a comprehensive panel dataset comprised
of 89 countries over 20 years.
Our investigation provides evidence that an increase in uncertainty would reduce the
availability of credit from financial institutions, lower bank returns and increase liquidity.
Significant changes in these aspects potentially imply that the health of the financial system
is at risk. Under uncertainty, banks’ non-performing loans increase significantly. These
findings are robust to a battery of sensitivity checks. We also show that our findings are
economically meaningful. For instance, we compute that financial depth would decline in
the order of 1.4% for a one sigma increase in uncertainty. Similarly, we compute that banks’
return on assets would decline at around 2% and non-interest income will increase in the
order of 1.4%, suggesting a deterioration in financial sector efficiency. Our empirical analysis
also predicts a 10% increase in non-performing loans of banks and a 4% increase in bank
liquid assets if uncertainty were to increase by one standard deviation. These figures suggest
that uncertainty threatens the health of the financial sector.
Given that small changes in the availability of credit can induce large fluctuations in an
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economy, as Bernanke (1983) and Bernanke and Gertler (1989) discuss, attention should be
paid to the overall health of the financial system rather just one aspect when examining
factors that affect the financial markets. Further research would be desirable to understand
uncertainty effects on the health of the financial sector at the country level. Such an investi-
gation should consider the differences that may emerge due to bank ownership because bank
managers may react differently to uncertainty as public versus private bank mandates are
expected to differ.30
30We thank the referee for pointing out this important issue.
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Table 1: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition Source
A. Dependent variables
1). Financial Depth
Domestic credit to private
sector (% of GDP) (FD1)
The ratio of domestic financial resources by financial intermediaries to the private sector with respect to GDP
(GFDD.DI.14).
GFDD
Private sector credit to
GDP (FD2)
Deposit money bank credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP (GFDD.DI.12). GFDD
2). Bank Efficiency
Bank Return on Equity
(ROE)
Commercial banks’ pre-tax income to yearly averaged equity (GFDD.EI.10) GFDD
Non-interest income to to-
tal income (NII)
Bank income that has been generated by non-interest related activities as a percentage of total income
(GFDD.EI.03).
GFDD
3). Bank Stability
Liquidity The ratio of the value of liquid assets to short-term funding plus total deposits (GFDD.SI.06). GFDD
Non-performing loans
NPLs
Ratio of defaulting loans to total gross loans (GFDD.SI.02) . GFD
B. Uncertainty proxies
Unexpected Inflation
Volatility (hˆ)
Constructed based on i) dynamic recursive forecasting (unexpD) or ii) static forecasting (unexpS) methods or
iii) by the within year standard deviation of inflation.
Datastream
C: Control Variables
Real GDP Growth
(∆GDP )
First difference of real gross domestic production at purchaser’s prices (NY.GDP.MKTP.CD). GFDD
Openness The ratio of a country’s exports of goods and services to country’s GDP (NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS). WDI
oBC Dummy variable that captures an ongoing banking crisis in the banking system (GFDD.OI.19). GFDD
Bank Concentration (%) Assets of three largest commercial banks as a share of total commercial banking assets (GFDD.OI.01). GFDD
Debt/GDP (%) The amount of international debt securities as a percentage of GDP. (GFDD.OI.15). GFDD
Foreign Banks (%) The percentage of the number of foreign owned banks to the number of the total banks in an Economy. A bank
is defined as foreign if 50 percent or more of the bank’s shares are owned by foreigners (GFDD.OI.15).
GFDD
WUI World uncertainly index covers 143 countries since 1996, based on the frequency counts of “uncertainty” (and
its variants) in the quarterly Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) country reports.
V ol Oil Oil price volatility.
Notes: GFDD: Global Financial Development Database; WDI: World Development Indicator.
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Table 2: Pairwise Correlations
FD1 FD2 ROE NII Liq NPLs hˆ Inflation ∆GDP Openness Bank Con Debt/GDP Foreign
FD1 1
FD2 0.990∗∗∗ 1
ROE -0.142∗∗∗ -0.170∗∗∗ 1
NII 0.0227 0.0327 -0.0238 1
Liq -0.0754∗∗ -0.0683∗ 0.0588∗ 0.391∗∗∗ 1
NPLs -0.206∗∗∗ -0.182∗∗∗ -0.264∗∗∗ 0.0446 -0.0467 1
hˆ -0.168∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗ -0.0525 0.146∗∗∗ 0.0990∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 1
Inflation -0.331∗∗∗ -0.334∗∗∗ 0.0473 0.163∗∗∗ 0.0286 0.208∗∗∗ 0.502∗∗∗ 1
∆GDP 0.152∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.0598∗ -0.0585∗ -0.0804∗∗ -0.138∗∗∗ -0.385∗∗∗ -0.361∗∗∗ 1
Openness 0.203∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ -0.0172 0.0297 0.0803∗∗ -0.0901∗∗ -0.0231 -0.118∗∗∗ -0.0277 1
Bank Con 0.121∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.0232 0.00629 0.0933∗∗ -0.0968∗∗∗ -0.0222 -0.115∗∗∗ -0.0736∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 1
Debt/GDP 0.426∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.0719∗ -0.169∗∗∗ -0.0249 0.271∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 1
Foreign -0.187∗∗∗ -0.178∗∗∗ -0.0144 -0.0385 0.0000655 0.0372 -0.0269 -0.0312 -0.0294 0.342∗∗∗ -0.148∗∗∗ -0.00101 1
Notes: FD1 is the ratio of domestic credit to private sector relative to GDP. FD2 is the ratio of private credit to the real sector by deposit money banks
and other financial institutions to GDP. ROE is commercial banks’ pre-tax income to yearly averaged equity. NII is the bank income that has been
generated by non-interest related activities as a percentage of total income. Liq is the ratio of the value of liquid assets to short-term funding plus total
deposits. NPLs is the ratio of defaulting loans to total gross loans. hˆ is the uncertainty based on dynamic recursive forecasting model. Inflation is cal-
culated as first logarithmic difference of prices. ∆GDP is calculated as the change in gross domestic product. Openness refers to the ratio of a country’s
exports of goods and services to country’s GDP. Bank Con measures the assets of three largest commercial banks as a share of total commercial banking
assets. Debt/GDP is the ratio of the amount of international debt securities as a percentage of GDP. Foreign is the percentage of the number of foreign
owned banks to the number of the total banks in an Economy. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote p < 0.05, p < 0.01 and p < 0.001, respectively.
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Table 3: Inflation Uncertainty Effects on Financial Depth
FD1 FD2
unexpD unexpS volCPI unexpD unexpS volCPI
hˆ -0.00117∗∗∗ -0.00189∗∗∗ -0.0199∗∗∗ -0.00117∗∗∗ -0.00188∗∗∗ -0.0198∗∗∗
(0.000242) (0.000395) (0.00451) (0.000235) (0.000381) (0.00437)
Inflation 0.262 0.209 0.200 -0.230 -0.283 -0.292
(0.795) (0.813) (0.811) (0.700) (0.716) (0.715)
∆GDP -0.211 -0.217 -0.220 -0.162 -0.167 -0.170
(0.145) (0.145) (0.148) (0.128) (0.128) (0.131)
Openness -0.183 -0.183 -0.183 -0.168 -0.167 -0.167
(0.164) (0.164) (0.164) (0.139) (0.139) (0.139)
oBC 10.73∗∗∗ 10.72∗∗∗ 10.77∗∗∗ 12.64∗∗∗ 12.63∗∗∗ 12.68∗∗∗
(3.980) (3.980) (3.977) (3.720) (3.720) (3.716)
Bank Con -0.116 -0.116 -0.119 -0.0781 -0.0778 -0.0808
(0.0953) (0.0954) (0.0953) (0.0922) (0.0922) (0.0923)
Debt/GDP 0.275∗∗ 0.276∗∗ 0.274∗∗ 0.288∗∗ 0.289∗∗ 0.287∗∗
(0.122) (0.122) (0.122) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114)
Foreign Banks 0.0920 0.0922 0.0946 0.0948 0.0950 0.0973
(0.136) (0.136) (0.136) (0.127) (0.127) (0.127)
i.year YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cons 59.59∗∗∗ 59.57∗∗∗ 59.66∗∗∗ 55.77∗∗∗ 55.75∗∗∗ 55.85∗∗∗
(7.993) (7.991) (7.995) (7.653) (7.652) (7.649)
N 1504 1504 1504 1496 1496 1496
R2 0.371 0.371 0.370 0.424 0.424 0.423
Notes: The table presents estimates of model 3 for three uncertainty proxies where FD1 and FD2
are the two financial depth measures used as dependent variables. unexpD is inflation uncertainty
obtained from the dynamic model. unexpS is inflation uncertainty obtained from static model.
volCPI is inflation uncertainty obtained from the intra-year standard deviation of inflation. See
Table 2 for variable definitions. In all models, country, year fixed effects are included. N denotes for
number of observations. R2 denotes goodness of fit. Robust standard errors, clustered by country
are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote p < 0.05, p < 0.01 and p < 0.001, respectively.
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Table 4: Inflation Uncertainty Effects on Efficiency
ROE NII
unexpD unexpS volCPI unexpD unexpS volCPI
hˆ -0.000348∗∗∗ -0.000454∗∗ -0.0153∗∗∗ 0.000585∗∗∗ 0.000973∗∗∗ 0.00828∗∗∗
(0.000128) (0.000222) (0.00312) (0.0000932) (0.000154) (0.00197)
Inflation 1.623 1.609 1.580 2.902∗∗∗ 2.929∗∗∗ 2.929∗∗∗
(1.272) (1.265) (1.250) (0.580) (0.592) (0.589)
∆GDP 0.0798 0.0782 0.0760 0.190∗∗ 0.192∗∗ 0.194∗∗
(0.141) (0.140) (0.141) (0.0810) (0.0813) (0.0821)
Openness -0.0372 -0.0371 -0.0369 0.0514 0.0512 0.0511
(0.0637) (0.0637) (0.0637) (0.0644) (0.0643) (0.0645)
oBC -15.25∗∗∗ -15.25∗∗∗ -15.27∗∗∗ 3.440∗∗ 3.443∗∗ 3.412∗∗
(2.448) (2.446) (2.450) (1.333) (1.334) (1.333)
Bank Con -0.00309 -0.00332 -0.00282 0.0434 0.0432 0.0449
(0.0605) (0.0606) (0.0604) (0.0389) (0.0389) (0.0389)
Debt/GDP 0.00152 0.00138 0.00185 0.0187 0.0185 0.0196
(0.0235) (0.0236) (0.0235) (0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0252)
Foreign Banks -0.130∗∗ -0.129∗∗ -0.131∗∗ -0.0749 -0.0749 -0.0765
(0.0555) (0.0556) (0.0554) (0.0650) (0.0650) (0.0651)
i.year YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cons 22.28∗∗∗ 22.28∗∗∗ 22.30∗∗∗ 30.61∗∗∗ 30.62∗∗∗ 30.57∗∗∗
(5.438) (5.439) (5.432) (3.643) (3.643) (3.643)
N 1521 1521 1521 1522 1522 1522
R2 0.186 0.186 0.187 0.383 0.383 0.382
Notes: The table presents estimates of model 3 for three uncertainty proxies where ROE and NII
are the two efficiency measures used as dependent variables. See Table 3 for variable definitions. In
all models, country, year fixed effects are included. N denotes for number of observations. R2 denotes
goodness of fit. Robust standard errors, clustered by country are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote
p < 0.05, p < 0.01 and p < 0.001, respectively.
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Table 5: Inflation Uncertainty Effects on Stability
Liquidity NPLs
unexpD unexpS volCPI unexpD unexpS volCPI
hˆ 0.00150∗∗∗ 0.00250∗∗∗ 0.0278∗∗∗ 0.000782∗∗∗ 0.000920∗∗∗ 0.0302
(0.000124) (0.000210) (0.00275) (0.0000862) (0.000101) (0.0376)
Inflation 0.215 0.286 0.301 0.365 0.363 0.367
(0.511) (0.502) (0.506) (0.742) (0.741) (0.734)
∆GDP 0.0452 0.0522 0.0564 -0.116 -0.116 -0.102
(0.0901) (0.0907) (0.0900) (0.193) (0.193) (0.197)
Openness -0.115 -0.116 -0.116 0.113∗∗ 0.113∗∗ 0.113∗∗
(0.0826) (0.0826) (0.0827) (0.0482) (0.0481) (0.0481)
oBC -0.507 -0.499 -0.559 6.480∗∗∗ 6.480∗∗∗ 6.452∗∗∗
(2.200) (2.200) (2.198) (1.041) (1.041) (1.040)
Bank Con 0.0838 0.0833 0.0870 0.0317 0.0317 0.0336
(0.0577) (0.0576) (0.0577) (0.0214) (0.0214) (0.0216)
Debt/GDP 0.0487 0.0483 0.0505 0.0286∗∗ 0.0286∗∗ 0.0298∗∗
(0.0485) (0.0484) (0.0487) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0122)
Foreign Banks -0.280∗∗∗ -0.280∗∗∗ -0.283∗∗∗ -0.0990∗∗ -0.0991∗∗ -0.100∗∗
(0.0780) (0.0779) (0.0783) (0.0453) (0.0453) (0.0453)
i.year YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cons 37.49∗∗∗ 37.52∗∗∗ 37.40∗∗∗ 4.282 4.291 4.221
(4.875) (4.871) (4.885) (2.906) (2.905) (2.924)
N 1528 1528 1528 1234 1234 1234
R2 0.149 0.150 0.144 0.411 0.411 0.408
Notes: The table presents estimates of model 3 for three uncertainty proxies where Liquidity
and NPLs are the two stability measures used as dependent variables. See Table 3 for variable
definitions. In all models, country, year fixed effects are included. N denotes for number of
observations. R2 denotes goodness of fit. Robust standard errors, clustered by country are in
parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote p < 0.05, p < 0.01 and p < 0.001, respectively.
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Table 6: Results for Income Groups
FD1 FD2 ROE NII Liquidity NPLs
L inc ∗ hˆ -0.0563∗∗∗ -0.0432∗∗∗ -0.120 0.00398 0.0352 0.0386∗∗∗
(0.0158) (0.0131) (0.150) (0.0117) (0.0270) (0.00847)
H inc ∗ hˆ -0.000980∗∗∗ -0.000980∗∗∗ -0.000301∗ 0.000566∗∗∗ 0.00141∗∗∗ 0.000791∗∗∗
(0.000230) (0.000223) (0.000161) (0.000101) (0.000143) (0.000106)
L inc ∗ Inflation -0.986 -0.900 2.164 -1.602 -0.105 0.140
(1.672) (1.554) (4.529) (2.068) (2.231) (1.152)
H inc ∗ Inflation 0.725 0.226 1.363 2.953∗∗∗ -0.181 -0.114
(0.774) (0.639) (1.316) (0.549) (0.556) (0.912)
L inc ∗∆GDP -2.933∗∗ -2.262∗ -3.654 -2.951∗∗∗ -0.327 -2.267∗∗∗
(1.331) (1.295) (2.512) (0.956) (1.279) (0.738)
H inc ∗∆GDP -0.192 -0.147 0.111 0.217∗∗ 0.0442 -0.109
(0.126) (0.111) (0.140) (0.0828) (0.0867) (0.202)
L inc ∗Openness 0.432 0.442 -0.0378 0.363∗∗∗ 0.304 0.249∗∗∗
(0.348) (0.325) (0.190) (0.119) (0.323) (0.0842)
H inc ∗Openness -0.322 -0.310∗ -0.0189 0.0207 -0.155∗ 0.0778∗
(0.197) (0.164) (0.0607) (0.0759) (0.0846) (0.0426)
L inc ∗ oBC 13.88∗∗ 15.95∗∗∗ -29.44∗∗∗ -0.744 -4.574 7.896∗∗∗
(5.328) (5.487) (10.93) (2.859) (5.296) (2.586)
H inc ∗ oBC 9.763∗∗ 11.71∗∗∗ -13.78∗∗∗ 3.830∗∗∗ -0.0659 6.167∗∗∗
(4.407) (4.075) (1.977) (1.369) (2.342) (1.081)
L inc ∗Bank Con -0.0972 -0.0789 0.126 0.0250 0.0429 -0.0202
(0.155) (0.148) (0.132) (0.0458) (0.0703) (0.0319)
H inc ∗Bank Con -0.130 -0.0865 -0.00801 0.0653 0.113 0.0489∗
(0.104) (0.101) (0.0522) (0.0522) (0.0812) (0.0281)
L inc ∗Debt/GDP 0.294 0.460 -0.771 0.339 -0.203 0.328∗∗
(0.412) (0.457) (0.717) (0.274) (0.442) (0.138)
H inc ∗Debt/GDP 0.281∗∗ 0.293∗∗ -0.000659 0.0169 0.0529 0.0283∗∗
(0.122) (0.114) (0.0242) (0.0250) (0.0494) (0.0125)
L inc ∗ Foreign Banks -0.347∗ -0.375∗∗ -0.0577 -0.0690 -0.126 -0.177∗∗∗
(0.192) (0.184) (0.141) (0.133) (0.156) (0.0478)
H inc ∗ Foreign Banks 0.246∗∗ 0.257∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗ -0.0764 -0.319∗∗∗ -0.0657
(0.118) (0.103) (0.0491) (0.0591) (0.0857) (0.0599)
i.year YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cons 59.36∗∗∗ 55.34∗∗∗ 21.61∗∗∗ 28.73∗∗∗ 35.37∗∗∗ 3.286
(7.424) (6.908) (4.874) (3.895) (5.481) (2.828)
N 1504 1496 1521 1522 1528 1234
R2 0.397 0.453 0.227 0.394 0.169 0.453
Notes: The table presents estimates for high and low income countries using dynamic uncertainty measure.
The high-income (low-income) countries are high and upper-middle (lower-middle and low group). The model is
estimated for financial depth, stability and efficiency measures. See Table 3 for definitions.
38
Table 7: Inflation Uncertainty Effects on Banks: IV-GMM Results
FD1 FD2 ROE NII Liq NPLs
hˆ -0.00175∗∗∗ -0.00198∗∗∗ -0.000199 0.000863∗∗ 0.00223∗∗∗ 0.000891∗∗∗
(0.000575) (0.000569) (0.000668) (0.000354) (0.000557) (0.000231)
Inflation -0.187 0.517 4.873∗ -0.214 0.934 -1.734
(1.508) (1.463) (2.489) (1.547) (1.193) (1.411)
realGDP growth -0.0981 0.0485 0.673∗∗ -0.0412 0.154 -0.437
(0.155) (0.155) (0.313) (0.139) (0.119) (0.315)
Openness -0.236∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗ 0.0114 0.0417 -0.0968∗∗∗ 0.0939∗∗∗
(0.0885) (0.0794) (0.0395) (0.0436) (0.0372) (0.0192)
oBC 10.16∗∗∗ 11.89∗∗∗ -14.82∗∗∗ 3.918∗∗∗ -0.0776 6.756∗∗∗
(2.216) (1.942) (2.429) (1.037) (1.216) (0.682)
Bank Con -0.0981∗∗ -0.0659 -0.0265 0.0660∗∗ 0.0716∗∗ 0.0369∗∗
(0.0442) (0.0404) (0.0493) (0.0284) (0.0360) (0.0150)
Debt GDP 0.290∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗ -0.00238 0.0248 0.0398 0.0305∗∗∗
(0.0608) (0.0529) (0.0151) (0.0237) (0.0262) (0.00819)
Foreign Banks 0.0745 0.0652 -0.0904∗ -0.0610 -0.266∗∗∗ -0.0902∗∗∗
(0.0560) (0.0514) (0.0533) (0.0429) (0.0420) (0.0239)
i.year YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 1474 1466 1487 1487 1493 1231
Hansen J test (p value) 0.454 0.243 0.132 0.219 0.426 0.432
C test (p value) 0.369 0.139 0.624 0.467 0.266 0.0873
Notes: The table presents the IV-GMM estimates of model 3 using the dynamic uncertainty measure for
financial depth, efficiency and stability measures. See Table 2 for variable definitions. In all models, country,
year fixed effects are included. N denotes for number of observations. Hansen J test is test of overidentifying
restrictions. C test denotes Hayashi C statistic for exogeneity. Robust standard errors, clustered by country
are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote p < 0.05, p < 0.01 and p < 0.001, respectively.
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Table 8: Country-level World Uncertainty Index (WUI) and Oil Uncertainty Augmented
Model
FD1 FD2 ROE NII Liq NPLs
hˆ -0.000967∗∗∗ -0.00105∗∗∗ -0.000287∗∗ 0.000544∗∗∗ 0.00148∗∗∗ 0.000735∗∗∗
(0.000207) (0.000212) (0.000129) (0.000104) (0.000155) (0.0000961)
Inflation -0.504 -0.544 1.708 2.339∗∗∗ 0.839 0.440
(1.002) (0.763) (1.571) (0.577) (0.611) (0.734)
∆GDP -0.260 -0.196 0.116 0.177 0.0141 -0.105
(0.235) (0.211) (0.250) (0.180) (0.163) (0.195)
Openness 0.0283 0.0255 -0.0474 0.0685 -0.107 0.117∗∗
(0.137) (0.113) (0.0826) (0.0728) (0.102) (0.0549)
oBC 12.29∗∗∗ 13.39∗∗∗ -15.97∗∗∗ 3.405∗∗ 0.711 5.860∗∗∗
(3.478) (3.298) (2.727) (1.440) (2.382) (0.932)
Bank Con -0.152 -0.109 -0.00495 0.0487 0.107∗ 0.0310
(0.0930) (0.0921) (0.0674) (0.0359) (0.0635) (0.0225)
Debt/GDP 0.132∗ 0.188∗∗ -0.0229 0.0350 0.0265 0.0434∗∗
(0.0720) (0.0801) (0.0248) (0.0462) (0.0599) (0.0197)
Foreign Banks 0.0553 0.0512 -0.122 -0.0757 -0.327∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.137) (0.0761) (0.0802) (0.0938) (0.0443)
V ol Oil -7.901∗∗∗ -7.940∗∗∗ -0.412 8.700∗∗∗ 0.0895 0.372∗∗
(2.242) (2.156) (0.846) (0.984) (1.445) (0.164)
WUI Country 5.879 7.111 1.992 -0.939 -2.448 2.036
(14.47) (12.41) (10.51) (9.923) (11.56) (5.550)
i.year YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cons 437.8∗∗∗ 434.7∗∗∗ 39.56 -384.3∗∗∗ 34.99 -14.85
(106.0) (102.1) (40.75) (48.37) (70.12) (9.029)
N 1315 1307 1325 1328 1331 1147
R2 0.341 0.389 0.195 0.440 0.165 0.425
Notes: The table presents estimates of model 3 using inflation uncertainty from the dynamic model
for financial depth, stability and efficiency measures. The model is augmented by country-level world
uncertainly index WUI Country and oil price volatility V ol Oil. See Table 2 for variable definitions.
In all estimations, country, year fixed effects are included. N denotes for number of observations. R2
denotes goodness of fit. Robust standard errors, clustered by country are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗
denote p < 0.05, p < 0.01 and p < 0.001, respectively.
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Table 9: Economic Impact
A βˆh Elasticity Impact B βˆh Elasticity Impact
FD1 -0.117 -0.076 1.392 FD2 -0.117 -0.078 -1.425
ROE 0.035 0.107 -1.963 NII 0.059 0.076 1.389
Liquidity 0.150 0.209 3.828 NPLs 0.078 0.545 9.983
Notes: βh is the uncertainty impact coefficient from models (column 1) in Tables 3-6 and has
been multiplied by 100; Impact is the implied percentage change in Index (%) in response to
a one standard deviation increase in uncertainty.
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Figure 1: Cross-country Dynamic Inflation Uncertainty Effects on Financial Sector
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